Delivering the Scary News: Newspaper Sourcing in a Bioterrorism Crisis

This study examines patterns in news sourcing and play, in light of risk communication factors. A content analysis of 457 U.S. newspaper stories about the 2001 anthrax attacks revealed that more stories included outrage rhetoric than risk explanations. Stories containing uncertainty factors appeared more often during the impact phase than any other crisis phase. The more sources a story used, the less likely it was to include vague advice and explanations. The more play that a story received, the less likely it was to include explanations. Health agency and law enforcement officials dominated the coverage, while scientists, victims, and citizens were quoted least often. Stories quoting experts received higher play than stories quoting non-experts. A relatively large proportion of stories quoted unnamed sources, only one source, or non-experts, indicating a lack of access to authoritative interview sources, especially during the outbreak and impact phases of the crisis.

attacks, officials withheld information from journalists because they feared widespread panic.
However, the lack of information itself alarmed the public (Chandler & Landrigan, 2004) because the resulting coverage often was conflicting, shallow, and lacked authoritative validation (Hobbs et al, 2004). Although many officials tried to balance uncertainty and reassurance, these messages ultimately sowed chaos and confusion (Brown, 2001). Journalists sometimes interpreted experts' hedging language as evidence of stonewalling or incompetence, rather than a portrayal of the uncertain nature of the situation, and then looked for sources who would speak with less caution (Lowrey et al, 2004). Experts later concluded that a greater public understanding of the anthrax threat would have helped reduce fear and panic (Cortes, 2001).
Shortly after the attacks, most Americans believed that government officials did not tell Americans everything they needed to know (Berke & Elder, 2001).
Top-down, one-way communication tries to bring public belief in line with expert views. When officials speak about a hazard, their main goal is to convey, "Have faith; we are in charge" (Coleman, 1995). Merely discussing uncertainty can reinforce anxiety and reduce public confidence (Krimsky & Plough, 1988). Official statements, meant to assure the public that the mail, airlines, or water supply is safe, may have the opposite effect. Instead of alleviating concern, such statements can increase anxiety and avoidance of an activity previously assumed to be safe. The very fact that an investigation is underway can provoke fear and suspicion (Slovic, 1987).
When stories advise the public to ignore scare-mongering statements, they may imply that those in charge are spreading deliberate distortions, which in turn can lead to polarization, confusion, and the perception that the hazard is unpredictable and uncontrollable (Beder & Shortland, 1992). Officials often explain the toxicity of a hazardous substance by referring to a higher benchmark, such as a public health standard, to try to persuade audiences that a risk is acceptable. However, people with negative views of government, the ones officials might wish a threat in a way that alarms the public when alarm is appropriate but does not cause audiences to discount news reports after long periods in which danger is covered only as a possibility (Lowrey et al, 2004).
Media speculation often occurs in the absence of centralized expertise, particularly when sources predict uncontrollable outcomes or continually warn of possible dangers (Furedi, 2002). Mediaconstructed conflict often portrayed a responsible government doing its best to deal with a hazardous situation pitted against non-experts expressing fears of the unknown. During the anthrax attacks, journalists frequently asked critics to speculate about possible outcomes. When the Pentagon began restricting information to the press, this led to increased speculation (Guckenberger, 2002). Even authoritative sources provided rumors, sweeping claims, and conspiracy theories, and repetitive network television news coverage highlighted speculation about future attacks (Ratzan, 2001).
Media relations officers prevent reporters from gaining access to information and experts when they do not know whether access will help rather than hinder an emergency response. But when journalists are denied access to authoritative sources, they must turn to less qualified or unnamed sources. In an Oct. 25, 2001 NPR interview, bioweapons policy consultant Matthew Meselson remarked, "A political person, or even an outside expert who isn't authorized and fully knowledgeable and fully in contact, may not know exactly what's right. A lot of things have been attributed to unnamed sources, which is certainly the worst thing of all, 'unnamed government sources.'" The use of anonymous sources is a prevalent criticism of media work and a top concern among newsrooms across the U.S. (Hickey, 1998). Deadline pressure often compels journalists to quote an unnamed source rather than search for someone who will go on the record with the information. In a rush to cut corners to break new aspects of a story, journalists sometimes provide only passing clarification about a source's identity and agenda (Geimann, 1998)

. A Pew
Research Center poll indicated that anonymous reporting has a negative impact on public perception of the news because it promotes unsubstantiated rumors (What the Polls Say, 1998). Most readers are bothered by unnamed sources, and those who doubt the credibility of stories that use unidentified sources are more likely to perceive bias (Gump, 2000). However, a content analysis of Time and Newsweek found that 81% of the articles in the national and international sections quoted unnamed sources (Wulfemeyer, 1985).
During the anthrax attacks, some anonymous reports were leaks from FBI/CIA briefings. For example, some facts about the composition of weaponized anthrax were leaked to CNN, U.S.
News and World Report and Newsweek magazines, which used anonymous attribution for this information (de Armond, 2002). Statements from anonymous government sources also were used in stories about a public investigation of Stephen Hatfill, a scientist who worked for the U.S. government on biowarfare matters, who was never charged with a crime (Kincaid, 2002).
The present study is based on the assumption that news coverage of anthrax contained uncertainty factors as well as explanations to help citizens put risks into context, that interview sources influenced story frames, and that stories with higher levels of play were more newsworthy. Two research questions and three hypotheses were used to guide an examination of the relationship between sourcing and play vs. the presence of uncertainty factors and explanations in anthrax coverage: R1: Which source types were prominent in the anthrax coverage?
R2: How did sourcing change over time?
H1: Stories containing explanations will quote experts more often than stories containing uncertainty.
H2: Stories containing uncertainty will use unnamed sources more often than stories containing explanations.
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings. The results reflect the subjective judgments of five raters, although the rate of intercoder reliability was high. Stories were drawn from an online database, rather than from a random sample of all coverage of the attacks, which reduces generalizability of the results. It was assumed that newspaper stories in the database would not be qualitatively different from stories not in the database.
Despite these limitations, the findings provide grounds for future research inquiries. Future research might explore whether the use of unnamed and non-expert sources in a crisis influence the level and types of public outrage. It might explore which types of experts provide the most effective explanations, especially when the public perceives a risk as more threatening than more common risks. A post-crisis survey also might evaluate whether audiences pay more attention to explanations and advice in stories that receive higher play.
In light of the outrage that followed media coverage of the anthrax attacks, this study highlights the necessity for reporters to seek sources who can provide context when discussing uncertainties and speculation, provide explanations, offer specific advice, assess risks to avoid over-or underestimating the threat, and clarify contradictions.